Golden Gate University School of Law

GGU Law Digital Commons
Jesse Carter Opinions

The Jesse Carter Collection

3-19-1954

People v. Jackson [DISSENT]
Jesse W. Carter
Supreme Court of California

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions
Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons
Recommended Citation
Carter, Jesse W., "People v. Jackson [DISSENT]" (1954). Jesse Carter Opinions. Paper 255.
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/carter_opinions/255

This Opinion is brought to you for free and open access by the The Jesse Carter Collection at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Jesse Carter Opinions by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

540

PEOPLE

v.

JACKSON

In Bank.

'l'HE

[42 C.2d

Mar.

v. CHESTER JACKSON,

Criminal Law-Instructions-Applicability to Facts.-It is
error to charge jury on abstract principles of law not pertinent
to issues in case since such an instruction tends to confuse and
mislead jury by injecting into case matters which undisputed
evidence shows are not involved.
Id.-Instructions-Applicability to Facts.-If evidence discloses facts pertinent to case and affecting substantial rights
of a party the court must instruct jury with reference to
applicable law when requested by either party (Pen. Code,
§ 1093, sub d. ( 6)) and
do so even though no request has
been made. (Pen. Code, 1127.)
[3] Id.-Defenses-Entrapment.-Under doctrine of entrapment,
the overt aets essential to commission of crime are assumed
to have been committed by defendant, but criminal intent,
also essential to completion of crime, is not assumed to have
been established and is assumed to be lacking when it did not
originate in mind of' defendant but was conceived in minds
of enforcement officers for unlawful purpose of inducing him
to commit a crime.
[ 4] ld.-Defenses-Entrapment.-Cooperation and encouragement
on part of enforcement officers are not enough to establish
entrapment; it is also necessary to show that intent to commit
acts which might lead to a criminal prosecution was generated
in minds of enforcement officers and not in mind of defendant.
[5] Id.-Instructions-Entrapment.-An instruction that the law
does not tolerate a person, particularly an enforcement officer,
generating in mind of innocent person original intent to commit a crime, thus entrapping him into commission of a crime
which he would not have committed or even contemplated but
for such inducement, and that defendant is not criminally
liable for such crime if intent to commit it did not originate
with him and he was not carrying out his own criminal purpose, but crime was suggested by another person acting with
purpose of entrapping and causing arrest of defendant, is a
correct statement of law on subject and, when given on theory
that jury might mistakenly consider conduct of officers as en-

[3] See Cal..Jur.2d, Criminal
§ 205 et seq.; Am.Jur., Criminal
Law, § 335 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1, 2] Criminal Law,§ 734; [3, 4] Criminal Law, §50; [5, 7] Criminal Law, § 761; [6] Criminal Law,
§ 1424; [8] Bribery, § 27.
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trapment though criminal intent originated in mind of defendant, is more favorable to defendant than he is entitled to.
[6] Id.-Appeal-Harmless and Reversible Error-Instructions.Where instruction on entrapment is more favorable to defendant than evidence justifies, he has no
cause for complaint.
[7] Id.-Instructions-Entrapment.--An instruction that when law
enforcement ofilcers are informed that a person intends to
commit a crime the law permits officers to afford opportunity
for commission of offense and to lend apparent cooperation of
themselves or a third person for
of detecting offender,
and that when such a practice is
peace officers,
if the suspect himself, originally and
of officers,
intends to commit acts constituting a crime, and
in pursuit
of such intent he personally does every act necessary to constitute a crime on his part, his guilt of crime thus committed
by him is not affected by, and he has no defense in, the fact
that when acts are done by him an officer or other person engaged in detecting crime is present and provides opportunity
or aids or encourages commission of offense, is a correct pronouncement of the law and may properly be given where evidence discloses pertinent facts.
[8] Bribery-Instructions.-In prosecution for offering to give
bribe to specified police officers with intent to influence them
in connection with operation of gambling and bookmaking in
city, it is not error to refuse an instruction tendered by defendant as to his beliefs concerning payoffs in police department as furnishing reasons for his proposals to police officers,
where jury was admonished during trial that defendant's testimony concerning reports and statements brought to his attention of existence of bookmaking and protection payoffs in
police department were admitted for limited purpose of showing his belief and that it was immaterial whether such reports
were true or false if he believed them to be true .

.APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Lo;:;
Angeles County and from an order denying a new triaL
Arnold Praeger, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for bribery. Judgment of conviction affirmed.
Jerome \Veber,
Ginsberg, '£heodore Flier and Jess
Whitehill for Appellant.
Edmund G.
Attorney
Norman H.
Deputy Attorney General, S. Ernest Roll, District Attorney
(Los Angeles), and Robert vYheeler, Deputy District Attorney,
for Respondent.
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SHENK, J-.-This is an
from a judgment convicting
the defendant of offering to bribe two police officers contrary
to the provisions of section 67 of the Penal Code, and from
an order denying a motion for a new trial. The bases for
the appeal are
errors in giving two instructions offered
by the prosecution and in
an instruction tendered
by the defendant.
The defendant had been a member of the Pasadena Police
Department for seven years when he resigned in September,
1951, to become a liquor salesman. During the four years
prior to his
he had been in the Detective Division
in the Pawnshop Detail and had frequently worked special
details with Officer Bornhoft of the Check and Forgery Detail.
A close personal friendship existed between these men and
their families. Also in the Detective Division was Officer
Thomas, a personal friend of Bornhoft but whom the defendant knew only slightly. None of these men had served
on the vice squad of the Pasadena Police Department. On
December 6, 1951, Thomas was appointed head of the vice
squad. The former members resigned or were shifted to other
assignments.
On the evening of December 6, 1951, defendant contacted
Bornhoft, who was then on vacation, at his home and asked
him how Thomas would take his new job. Bornhoft replied
he didn't know as Thomas was a peculiar person to figure
out. Defendant then stated that he knew that neither of
them believed in the more violent types of crime, such as
burglary, robbery and homicide, but they both knew that
gambling and bookmaking existed and would continue to
exist in the community; that he had learned a lot about it
he hadn't known while he was in the department; and that
either Thomas would allow these things to go on or he would
not remain in charge of the vice squad very long. He told
Bornhoft that because of the latter's close friendship with
Thomas he (defendant) and other people thought that Bornhaft would be the logical person to contact Thomas and see how
he felt about allowing these things to continue. He intimated
that if a meeting could be arranged there might be anywhere
from $25 to $100 a week in it for Bornhoft. He suggested
the following Tuesday
for such a meeting. Bornhoft
advised Thomas of this conversation the following day, Sunday, and on Monday when he returned to work he reported
the conversation to his
officer and to the chief of
police. He and Thomas were advised by them to go along
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with the defendant's proposal, to find out who were behind the
whole thing.
On December 11th they met as suggested by defendant,
had dinner, and then, again at defendant's suggestion, they
drove in his car to a cafe in Eagle Rock. Bornhoft opened
the conversation by stating that Thomas knew why they
were there and to get on with the business. Defendant remarked that he knew how they all felt about the more violent
type of crimes, but that there had been payoffs to the police
department in the past with regard to gambling and bookmaking activities and there were some in the department
at that time who felt the same way. He would not answer
Thomas' query as to who these men were. He stated that
he represented a group of people who wanted to get action
(a movement of money in gambling) started, and that Thomas,
as head of the vice squad, could make from $100 to $1,000
a week by ''doing nothing.'' \Vhen Thomas asked what his
duties would be he said that if any complaints came in about
telephone places or spots (a place where bets are received
by a bookmaking agent) Thomas was to call a certain phone
number; that a place would have to operate 6 to 8 weeks
in order to pay; and that thereafter if any complaints were
received a raid could be arranged with "fall guys" (not
the real operators) set up to stand arrest and undergo prosecution. Thomas would not give him a definite answer, saying
that he had to know more of the details about the risks and
reward involved and would have to know everyone who was
in on the arrangements. He asked defendant what he knew
about the Foothill Charter Club at 10 East Colorado Boulevard, and when defendant countered with the inquiry, "what
did Thomas lmow," Thomas replied that he probably knew
more about it than the defendant realized. Thomas testified
at the trial that he told defendant how that place was set
up and that the reward he would require for allowing such
a place to operate would, in view of the risks involved, be
$62,500. This sum he arrived at
calculating the amount
his salary would bring him for the next 10 years, at the
end of which time he expected to retire.
On December 17th defendant saw Bornhoft and inquired
as to Thomas' reaction. Bornhoft advised he didn't know
and that the defendant would have to ask Thomas. At defendant's request a meeting was arranged for the following
night, December 17th. Thomas insisted that Bornhoft also
be present and informed defendant that before he would
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any further he would have to be sure that everyDefendant told him that
of Santa .Anita,
; that it concerned the opening
at various
around the city,
for which
Thomas would receive $300 a week,
and if these
well or other operations were opened up,
he would receive more. No further duties were required of
Bornhoft but he was to receive a weekly sum for his share in
arranging the meetings with Thomas. Defendant told Thomas
that he didn't know if he could get all the persons involved
together for a meeting as 'l'homas had demanded, but he
would try. No further contact was made by defendant with
either Bornhoft or Thomas. Several months later an information was filed against the defendant charging him with
offering a bribe to Officers Bornhoft and Thomas with the
corrupt intent to influence them as police officers. He was
subsequently tried before a jury and convicted. .A motion
for new trial was denied. The defendant was sentenced to
state prison for the term prescribed by law, but execution of
sentence was suspended and he was granted probation on
condition that he serve nine months of the probationary period
in the county jail.
At the trial defendant admitted that he had initiated the
meetings with Bornhoft and Thomas and had proposed the
payoff scheme to them, but he denied that he had any corrupt
intent in so doing. His defense was that the proposal was
a fictitious one, designed to test the honesty of the officers
involved as a part of his plan to apprehend one Wiseman,
a bookmaker in Pasadena who he believed was the head of
the bookmaking ring there. \Viseman had been a member
of the vice squad when 'one Clint Wright was in charge of
it, prior to Thomas' appointment. Defendant testified that
he believed that certain members of the vice squad had been
accepting payoffs for protecting gambling and bookmaking
in Pasadena and that he had determined that if he could
prove to himself that the new head of the vice squad, Thomas,
was honest he would enlist his aid in apprehending Wiseman
and the members of the
department who he believed
had been accepting payoffs. He contended that there was
no one behind
that he was not representing any persons
or interests, and that the fictitious proposal was entirely his
own idea, made for the altruistic purpose of civic betterment.
The·defendant attempted to show at the trial that his state
Amvh·,+~
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various considerawhile visit"d"U"'4"' both with
with
Wiseman's activities; his observations of persons
and his conversations with Wisemaking and receiving
man himself. He also attempted to
as further grounds
for his belief that some members of the
department
could not be trusted : that valuable properties were owned
by certain members of the department which were out of proportion to their
salaries; that reports had been made
to the vice squad concerning gambling with apparently no
official action taken; that the sheriff's office was called in to
participate in raids on gambling establishments within the
city limits; and that soon after certain raids had taken place
the former members of the vice squad had been shifted and
Thomas had been appointed as head of the new vice squad.
This evidence was admitted by the court for the limited
purpose of showing the intent of the defendant and the reasons
for his asserted activities.
The court admonished the jury as follows: "Now, ladies
and gentlemen of the jury, I should explain this to you: that
in admitting evidence of this character, it only goes to the
question of the state of mind or the intent of the defendant,
and goes to his reasons for his state of mind or his intent
at that time. It doesn't establish the truth or falsity of the
conversations which he will relate, and it is not necessary,
either, for him to prove their truth nor for the People to
prove the untruthfulness of them." And, "Now, I should
state to the jury that a person may testify directly as to
his intention. In other words, as to why he did a certain
thing, and that is direct evidence. Witnesses may also testify
as to the basis upon which they formed their intention and
upon which the witness acted. It does not prove-the testimony of the reason, or relating to the reason that the witness
gives for the forming of his intention, or why he acted, does
not prove either the truth or falsity of the reasons which
he gives, and you must weigh those matters in the light of
the testimony that you hear from this stand."
The defendant especially complains of two instructions
given at the request of the prosecution on the subject of
entrapment and asserts that they relate to rules of law not
applicable to the case. He contends that these instructions

of mind in this matter was influenced

42 C.2d-18
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tended to confuse the minds of the
as to the issues
and the evidence, and that they resulted in
error.
The instructions are as follows :
"No. 851. The law does not tolerate a person, particularly
a law enforcement officer, generating in the mind of a person
who is innocent of any criminal purpose, the original intent
to commit a crime thus entrapping such person into the
commission of a crime which he would not have committed
or even contemplated but for such inducement; and where
a crime is committed as a consequence of such entrapment,
no conviction may be had of the person so entrapped as his
acts do not constitute a crime.
''If the intent to commit the crime did not originate with
the defendant and he was not carrying out his own criminal
purpose, but the crime was suggested by another person acting
with the purpose of entrapping and causing the arrest of
the defendant, then the defendant is not criminally liable
for the acts so committed.''
"No. 852. When law enforcement officers are informed
that a person intends to commit a crime, the law, in the
interests of law enforcement and the suppression of crime,
permits the officers to afford opportunity for the commission
of the offense, and to lend the apparent cooperation of themselves or of a third person for the purpose of detecting the
offender. When such a practice is followed by peace officers,
if the suspect himself, originally and independently of the
officers, intends to commit the acts constituting a crime, and
if in pursuit of such intent he personally does every act
necessary to constitute a crime on his part, his guilt of the
crime thus committed by him is not affected by, and he has
no defense in, the fact that when the acts are done by him
an officer or other person engaged in detecting crime is present
and provides the opportunity, or aids or encourages the commission of the offense.''
Under the provisions of section 1093, subdivision 6, of the
Penal Code the duty is laid on the
to charge the jury ''on
any points of law pertinent to the issue, if requested by either
party'' ; and section 1127 of the same code, as amended in
1935, provides that ''In charging the jury the court may
instruct the jury regarding the law applicable to the facts
of the case . . . " [1] It has long been the law that it is
error to charge the jury on abstract principles of law not
pertinent to the issues in the case. (People v. Roe (1922),
189 Cal. 548, 558 [209 P. 560] .) The reason for the rule
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is obvious. Such an instruction tends to confuse and mislead
the jury by injecting into the case matters which the undisputed evidence shows are not involved.
But if the
evidence discloses facts pertinent to the case and affecting
the substantial rights of a party the court, as above indicated,
with reference to the applicable law
must instruct the
when requested by either party and may do so even though
no request l1as been made.
The question then is : '\Vas there evidence in the case
which would justify tl1e court in giving the instructions
complained of~
[3] Under the doctrine of entrapment, the overt acts
essential to the commission of the offense charged are assumed
to have been committed by the defendant. But the criminal
intent, as here also essential to the completion of the crime,
is not assumed to have been established. It is assumed to be
lacking when it did not originate in the mind of the defendant
but was conceived in the minds of the enforcement officers
for the unlawful purpose of inducing him to commit a crime.
Here the evidenee as to the overt acts committed by the defendant is undisputed. In fact he admitted the commission
of them. He also admitted an intention to perform them
but sought to avoid any criminal responsibility flowing therefrom by claiming that his intention was to test the honesty
and integrity of the incoming head of the vice squad by
submitting to him a plan for police protection and discover
whether he would or would not agree to it. The question of
criminal intention was the only issue at the trial.
The record discloses a factual situation which the
attorney general in his brief calls a "coloration of entrapment.'' Without an instruction on the subject the jury
might have applied to the evidence of cooperation and encouragement on the part of the officers a layman's conception
of what constitutes entrapment. With this condition of the
evidence the prosecution and the trial court deemed it advisable to instruct the jury on the essentials of entrapment
which when shown to be present would absolve the defendant
of any criminal responsibility; but under the Jaw that cooperation and encouragement on the part of the officers were
not enough. It was also necessary to show that the intent
to commit the acts which might lead to a criminal prosecution
was generated in the minds of the enforcement officers and
not in the mind of the defendant.
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Instruction No. 851 on entrapment is a correct stateof the law on the subject. It was no doubt given on
that under the admitted facts the
might misconsider the conduct of the officers as entrapment
even
the criminal intent originated in the mind of
the defendant. Viewed in that light the instruction was more
favorable to the defendant than he was entitled to. If the
had returned a verdict of not
on the theory of
that instruction the
could have no cause to comfor the reason that it had itself offered the instruction.
And
more favorable to the defendant than the
evidence justified he has no just cause for complaint. (James
v. E. G. Lyons Co., 147 Cal. 69, 76 [81 P. 275] ; People v.
Lanzit, 70 Cal.App. 498, 513 [233 P. 816].) Thus instruction
No. 851 cannot be said to have misled the jury as to the
main issue in the case, namely, whether the defendant had
first conceived the intent to commit bribery; nor to have constituted an instruction that the jury was to assume that
the original intent was first generated in the mind of the
defendant. (See People v. Chessman, 38 Cal.2d 166, 182-183
[238 P.2d 1001].)
[7] Instruction No. 852 is also a correct pronouncement
of the law and its application fits precisely into the facts of
this case. There can be no question but that the evidence is
sufficient to support the implied finding of the jury that the
intention to commit the crime originated in the mind of the
defendant and that the conduct of the police officers was
within the rule of apparent cooperation which the law permits
in the detection and prosecution of crime. The jury was not
required to accept as true the defendant's alleged altruistic
attitude and rather fantastic claim that his motive in thus
planning police protection for gambling operations was to
test the integrity of the incoming head of the vice squad
of the police department. There was no error in giving
either and both of these instructions.
[8] The defendant also complains of the refusal of the
court to
an instruction tendered by him as to his beliefs
concerning
in the police department as furnishing
reasons for his proposals to the police officers. As above
the
was ailmonished
the trial that the
defendant's
reports and statements
to his attention as to the existence of bookmaking
and protection payoffs in the police department were admitted
for the limited purpose of showing his belief and that it
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was immaterial whether such
were true or false if
he believed them to be true. These admonitions ;,wtw.ou:oH
eovered the subject matter of the refused instruction. A
review of the instructions as
whole demonstrates that the
jury was
and
advised as to the
of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant in the first
instance had a specific intent wilfully, knowingly and corruptly to influence the officers in question in the performance
of their official duties. He was ably represented by counsel
and had a full and fair trial free from error.
The judgment and order are affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I concur in the conclusion that the judgment
and order denying defendant a new trial must be affirmed.
I do not agree, however, that there is any evidence in the
record which would support an instruction on entrapment.
In the majority opinion it is admitted that " [ t]he question
of criminal intention was the only issue at the trial."
The jury was adequately instructed on the intent necessary
to constitute the crime, and under the facts presented it is
to be presumed that it found that defendant did possess that
intent.
While I feel that there was no evidence to support the
instructions given on entrapment, I do not feel that under
the evidence presented the instructions could have confused
the jury so as to result in any prejudice to defendant. For
that reason, I concur in the judgment.
Schauer, J., concurred.

